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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Perhaps the best way to understand early-Twenty-First Century state 
and federal cannabis law in the United States is to examine the relevant history. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s statement is apropos: “[A] page of history 
is worth a volume of logic.”1 This article begins by discussing the early history 
of cannabis and its uses. Next, this article examines the first state and federal 
marijuana laws. After a brief comparison of alcohol prohibition to cannabis 
prohibition, this article addresses cannabis laws from the 1920s to the early 
1950s. Then, this article takes up the reorganization of the federal drug 
regulatory bureaucracy since its inception. Addressing the current era of 
cannabis laws and regulations, this article recounts how marijuana became a 
Schedule I drug. The discussion then turns to changing social attitudes towards 
cannabis as reflected in presidential politics and popular culture. Starting with 
the late-1990s, this article describes the development of state and federal 
cannabis laws and policies up to the present day. 
By definition, the term “present day” temporally fixes this article to late 
2020. This is problematic because cannabis laws constantly change. It is 
entirely possible that this article will be rendered obsolete in the near future. 
For example, currently-pending, federal legislation could fundamentally change 
cannabis law and policy.2 Indeed, on November 20, 2019, the U.S. House of 
Representatives Judiciary Committee passed the Marijuana Opportunity 
Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019 (MORE Act).3 This legislation 
would, inter alia, remove cannabis from the federal Controlled Substances Act 
and allow the individual States to regulate the cannabis industry within their 
respective borders.4 Thus, this article shall avoid attempting to predict the 
future. In any event, per Justice Holmes, the past is always relevant to the 
future. 
This article is based upon a February 2019 presentation delivered to The 
Center for Health Law and Policy at Cleveland State University, Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law. The author is grateful to the law school for the 
opportunity to present this article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.). 
2 See, e.g., Secure and Fair Enforcement Banking Act of 2019, H.R. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019); 
Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S. 3032, 116th Cong. (2019); 
Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act, H.R. 420, 116th Cong. (2019). 
3 See Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act, H.R. 3848, 116th Cong. 
(2019). 
4 See generally id. 
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II. EARLY HISTORY OF CANNABIS 
 
Cannabis has historically been known by several names, such as 
“hemp,” “Indian hemp,” “marywana,” “maraguana,” and “marihuana.”5 Official 
Jamaican government documents use the term “ganja.”6 “Marihuana,” with an 
“H,” is the traditional spelling in the United States, particularly in official, 
government documents.7 “Marijuana,” with a “J,” is the popular, contemporary 
spelling.8 The preferred term among pro-cannabis advocates is “cannabis” 
because the term “marihuana” is associated with early-Twentieth Century, anti-
cannabis propaganda to brand the drug as a foreign, and therefore dangerous, 
substance.9 “Cannabis” is the Latin form of the Greek word “κάνναβις.” 
Researchers from the University of Vermont have recently concluded 
that cannabis originated in the Tibetan Plateau twenty-eight million years ago.10 
Hemp cultivation began in Western China in antiquity, and then spread to 
Central Asia, India, Asia Minor, and Africa.11 Historically, hemp has had three 
primary uses: (i) Fiber for rope, twine, cloth, and textiles,(ii) seeds for oil and 
birdseed, and (iii) resin for medicine, religious rituals, and as an intoxicant.12 
Hemp was used medicinally in Ayurvedic medicine in India as early as the Fourth 
Century B.C.E.13 By the Fourteenth Century, hemp cultivation began in 
Europe.14 
 
5 See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION:A 
HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES XIX (1974). 
6 See, e.g., Jamaican Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2015, §3(a) (defining “ganja”). 
7 See, e.g., Ohio R.C. §2925.01(D)(1) (using the term “marihuana”); Michigan statutes 
§§333.26421-26430 (“Michigan Medical Marihuana Act”); 21 U.S.C. §812, Schedule I(c)(10) 
(using the term “marihuana”). 
8 See, e.g., Ohio R.C. Chapter 3796 (“Ohio Medical Marijuana Control Program”). See also 
Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 211, p. 58523, fn. 2 (“Although the statutory spelling is 
“marihuana” in the Controlled Substances Act, this rule [(i.e., 7 C.F.R. Part 990)] uses the more 
commonly used spelling of marijuana.”). 
9 But see Robert A. Mikos & Cindy D. Kam, Has the “M” word been framed? Marijuana, 
cannabis, and public opinion, Plos One (Oct. 31, 2019) 
(https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0224289) (last visited Sept. 25, 
2020) (“Throughout each of our tests, we find no evidence to suggest that the public distinguishes 
between the terms “marijuana” and “cannabis.” We conclude with implications of our findings for 
debates over marijuana/cannabis policy and for framing in policy discourse more generally.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
10 See Origins of cannabis traced back 28 million years to the Tibetan Plateau 
https://www.earth.com/news/origins- cannabis-tibetan-plateau/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2020). 
11 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 1-2. 
12 See id. at 1. 
13 See Ethan Russo, M.D., Historical Review of Cannabis for Pain Relief and Addiction 
Treatment, p. 4 (2018). 
14 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 2. 
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Carl Linnaeus first classified the genus Cannabis in 1753.15 Within the 
Cannabis genus are the species C. sativa and C. indica. Some taxonomists 
recognize a third species: C. ruderalis. However, others classify C. ruderalis as 
a sub-species of C. sativa.16 Hemp is a variant of C. sativa. Sub-varieties of 
cannabis are traditionally known as “strains.” However, the term “cultivar” is 
enjoying increasing currency in the cannabis industry. 
The Spanish introduced hemp to the Western Hemisphere in modern-
day Chile in 1545.17 In the modern-day United States, hemp cultivation began 
in (i) 1611 in Jamestown, Virginia, (ii) 1632 in Massachusetts, (iii) 1775 in 
Kentucky, and (iv) 1835 in Missouri.18 By the 1850s, hemp was grown in 
California, Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, and Nebraska.19 Hemp processing 
occurred throughout the Great Lakes region.20In the mid-1800s, cotton replaced 
hemp as a textile source. This caused hemp production to decline. However, 
hemp continued to grow wildly throughout the United States.21 
In 1839, Irish physician William B. O’Shaughnessy, M.D., published a 
paper entitled   On the Preparations of the Indian Hemp, or Gunjah (Cannabis 
Indica).22 Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s paper discussed, inter alia, the use of cannabis to 
successfully treat rheumatic disorders.23 In 1848, Scottish physician Robert A. 
Christison authored A dispensatory of commentary on the pharmacopoeias of 
Great Britain and the United States, which stated, in part: 
 
Indian hemp has been used as antispasmodic in hydrophobia, 
tetanus, malignant cholera, and infantile convulsions, with 
marked relief in repeated instances. Some cases of tetanus 
appear to have been cured in the East-Indies by it;—It has been 
employed with success as an anodyne in chronic rheumatism, 
 
15 See id. at 1. 
16 See 84 Fed. Reg. 58,531 (Oct. 31, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt 990) (“Cannabis is a 
genus of flowering plants in the family Cannabaceae of which Cannabis sativa is a species, and 
Cannabis indica and Cannabis ruderalis are subspecies thereof.”). 
17 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 2-3. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. at 58,540 (“The production of hemp has a long history in the United States Prior to the 
mid-20th Century, hemp had been cultivated in the U.S. for hundreds of years to make flags, sails, 
rope, and paper. The first regulation of hemp occurred in 1937 with the Marihuana Tax Act, which 
required all producers of the species Cannabis sativa to register with and apply for a license from 
the Federal Government. The “Hemp for Victory” Campaign during World War II promoted the 
production of hemp for rope to be used by U.S. military forces, but at the end of the war, the 
requirements in the Marihuana Tax Act resumed. In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled 
Substances Act, granting the Attorney General the authority to regulate production of hemp.”) 
(capitalization in original). 
22 See RUSSO, supra note 13, at 21. 
23 See id. 
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toothache, and other varieties of neuralgia. I have used it a good 
deal and with great success, in diseases at large, to obtain sleep.24 
 
Military physicians used cannabis as an analgesic in the treatment of 
combat injuries during the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865).25 Finally, in 1891, 
American physician J.B. Mattison published an important paper in the St. Louis 
Medical and Surgical Journal.26 Dr. Mattison noted the effectiveness of 
cannabis in treating cocaine and opiate addiction.27 Moreover, he reported 
success in treating migraine headaches with cannabis: 
In headache, periodical or long continued, one half to two grains 
solid extract may be given each hour or two till the attack is 
arrested, and then continued in a similar dose, morning and 
night, for weeks or months. It is important not to quit the drug 
during a respite from pain. Recollect that hemp eases pain 
without disturbing stomach and secretions so often as opium, and 
that competent men think it not only calmative, but curative.28 
 
Thus, the Nineteenth Century saw the beginnings of serious scientific study of 
the medicinal benefits of cannabis. 
By the late-Nineteenth to early-Twentieth Centuries, cannabis use in the 
United States was largely confined to medicinal applications. Moreover, there 
was not a significant degree of recreational cannabis use in the United States 
during this period. Instead, Americans at this time recreationally used alcohol, 
tobacco, opium, morphine, and cocaine.29 In Mexico, on the other hand, 
smoking cannabis as an intoxicant was common from the 1880s onward. For 
example, Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s soldiers were known to smoke cannabis.30 
Recreational cannabis consumption also occurred in the Caribbean. The 
practice of smoking cannabis as an intoxicant was imported from Mexico to the 
United States along the Rio Grande River in the early-1900s.31 Caribbean 
merchants and sailors also introduced cannabis into cities along the Gulf of 
 
24 Id. at 24. 
25 See id. at 25 (quoting 4 The Medical and Surgical History of the Civil War (1992)). 
26 See id. at 33. 
27 See id. (“In these, often, [cannabis] has proved an efficient substitute for the poppy.”). 
28 Id. at 34 (quoting Cannabis indica as an anodyne and hypnotic, 61 St. Louis Med. Surg. J. 265-
71 (1891)). In addition to the aforementioned Nineteenth Century medical cannabis researchers, 
there were Edward A. Birch, John Clendinning, M.D., Thomas D. Crothers, M.D., Michael 
Donovan, William R. Gowers, Richard Greene, M.D., Hobart Hare, M.D., Silas Weir Mitchell, 
John Russell Reynolds, and Édouard Séguin. Working primarily in England, France, India, 
Ireland, and the United States, these individuals pioneered the study of medicinal cannabis. See id. 
at 22-35. 
29 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 9. 
30 See id. at 4-5. 
31 See id. See also id. at 32-34. 
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Mexico such as New Orleans, Houston, and Galveston.32 
 
III. THE FIRST STATE AND FEDERAL MARIJUANA LAWS 
 
A. Early Federal Legislation 
 
The federal government began legislatively controlling drugs in 1906 
when Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act. This act was “the first major 
federal drug legislation to require labeling of all preparations containing more 
than prescribed amounts of opiates . . .”33 Three years later, federal legislators 
passed the “Act to Prohibit Importation and Use of Opium,” which “barred the 
importation of opium at other than specified ports and for other than medicinal 
use.”34 These federal laws were the first steps in what would ultimately become 
federal cannabis prohibition. 
 
B. 1914 El Paso, Texas City Ordinance Banning Sale and Possession of 
Marijuana 
 
Given that recreational cannabis was introduced into the United States 
primarily along the United States-Mexico border, it is not a mere coincidence 
that perhaps the first, express cannabis prohibition law arose in a border city on 
the Rio Grande River: El Paso, Texas. In 1914, El Paso enacted a city ordinance 
which banned the sale and possession of cannabis.35 The rationale for this 
ordinance was the belief that cannabis use caused violent behavior among 
Mexicans, “Negroes, prostitutes, pimps, and a criminal class of whites.”36 This 
rationale—the Criminality Theory—was representative of the prevailing view 
among policymakers of the time. Here, one can clearly see the racism and class 
bias that would inform cannabis law and policy ever since. 
 
C. Harrison Narcotics Tax Act 
 
In 1914, Congress passed the Opium and Coca Leaves Trade 
Restrictions Act. This law is better known as the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, 
named after its sponsor Representative Francis B. Harrison (D-NY). This law 
“required registration and payment of an occupational tax by all persons who 
 
32 See id. at 42. 
33 Id. at 15. 
34 Id. 
35 See id. at 34. 
36 Report of Investigation in the State of Texas, Particularly along the Mexican Border, of the Traffic 
in, and Consumption of the Drug Generally known as “Indian Hemp,” or Cannabis Indica, known 
in Mexico and States Bordering on the Rio Grande as “Marihuana’; Sometimes also referred to as 
“Rosa Maria,” or “Juanita.” Federal Bureau of Narcotics files (Apr. 13, 1917), p. 
13.http://antiquecannabisbook.com/TexasReport1917/TexasReport1917.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 
2020). 
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imported, produced, dealt in, sold, or gave away opium and coca leaves and 
their derivatives.”37As American government was understood in 1914, only 
States could regulate the practice of medicine, and the federal government 
could not do so unless the activity involved interstate commerce.38 But, the 
federal government expressly has the constitutional power to tax.39 So, the courts 
upheld the Harrison Act on revenue raising grounds. Eventually, the Harrison 
Act effectively became a prohibition law.40 Between 1914 and 1931, the 
individual States responded to the Harrison Act by passing their own laws 
criminalizing possession of cocaine, opiates, and drug paraphernalia.41 These 
State laws were known as “Little Harrison Acts.” 
 
D. Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act and the Federal Narcotics Control 
Board 
Congress passed the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act in 1922. This 
law (i) established the Federal Narcotics Control Board,42 and (ii) made drug 
possession a federal crime.43 At this time, policymakers did not use the term 
“narcotic” according to its scientific definition. Instead, “narcotic” was 
understood to mean any drug used by individuals of low socio-economic 
standing: 
 
The most important feature of this initial prohibitory phase is 
that marihuana was inevitably viewed as a “narcotic” drug, 
thereby invoking the broad consensus underlying the nation’s 
recently enunciated antinarcotics policy. This classification 
emerged primarily from the drug’s alien character. Although use 
of some drugs— alcohol and tobacco—was indigenous to 
American life, the use of “narcotics” for pleasure was not. 
Evidently, drugs associated with ethnic minorities and with 
otherwise “immoral” populations were automatically viewed as 
“narcotics.”44 
 
Thus, cannabis was classified as a narcotic. And, because narcotics were 
outlawed, cannabis was outlawed. 
 
 
 
37 BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 16. 
38 See id. at 61. 
39 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
40 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 19-20. 
41 See id. at 38-39, 52. 
42 See part VIII, infra (discussing the Federal Narcotics Control Board). 
43 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 20. 
44 Id. at 51. 
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IV. ALCOHOL PROHIBITION & MARIJUANA PROHIBITION 
 
Narcotics prohibition and the broader War on Drugs are often compared 
to alcohol prohibition.  The Eighteenth Amendment to   the   U.S.   Constitution 
(1917)   provides: “The manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating 
liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the 
United States and all the territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage 
purposes is hereby prohibited.” The Volstead Act, enacted in 1919, 
implemented the Eighteenth Amendment. 
Alcohol prohibition was animated by concerns over excessive 
consumption, political corruption, and the “evils” of saloons as dens of vice and 
anti-social activity.45 For example, some men would get drunk after work and 
then go home and physically abuse their wives and children. Conscientious 
prohibitionists sought to remedy this horrible situation. Prohibitionists were 
also motivated by nativism, however. Italian immigrants drank wine. German 
immigrants drank beer. Irish immigrants drank whiskey. Moreover, saloons 
served as community centers and places of political organization for  these  
immigrant communities. By criminalizing alcohol, nativist prohibitionists could 
strike a blow against these immigrants’ cultures and fledgling political power. 
Narcotic prohibition was animated by concerns over “immorality” and 
disfavored groups like immigrants and ethnic minorities.46 Therefore, some 
historians have argued that alcohol prohibition and narcotic prohibition 
merely coincided in time and that they were caused by separate and distinct 
social forces.47 More recent historiography holds that alcohol prohibition and 
narcotics prohibition are closely related phenomena. For example, historian 
Lisa McGirr argues that alcohol prohibition laid the foundation for the War on 
Drugs and the dramatic increase in federal incarceration of drug offenders.48 In 
any event, beginning in the late-Twentieth Century, cannabis legalization 
advocates pointed to the history and unintended consequences of alcohol 
prohibition as an argument against cannabis prohibition.49 
 
V. 1920S TO 1940S 
 
A. Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act and Anslinger’s Army 
 
On June 14, 1930, Congress abolished the Federal Narcotics Control 
Board and replaced it with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). The FBN 
 
45 See id. at 21-27. 
46 See id. at 27. 
47 See id. at 26-27. 
48See generally LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE 
AMERICAN STATE (2016). 
49 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 21-22, 26-27, 28-31. 
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was within the Treasury Department.50 Approximately one month later, 
President Hoover and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon appointed Harry J. 
Anslinger commissioner of the FBN. Anslinger served as FBN commissioner 
until 1962.51 Anslinger is a hero or a villain depending on which side of the 
cannabis issue one supports. Anslinger’s views on cannabis are summed up in 
his 1937 statement: “If the hideous monster Frankenstein came face to face 
with the monster Marihuana, he would drop dead of fright.”52 
During the 1920s and 1930s, rising crime and anti-Mexican bias lead to 
calls for cannabis prohibition.53Anslinger and the FBN enthusiastically 
answered that call. However, at this time in American history, federal 
government power was more circumscribed than it is in the modern era. As the 
U.S. Constitution was then-understood, the federal government had very 
limited regulatory power because most such powers were still wielded by the 
individual States. This was before the New Deal and its expansion of federal 
authority. So, rather than seek a federal strategy, Anslinger pursued a national 
regulatory regime through uniform State laws. Under Anslinger’s influence, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the 
Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act on September 15, 1932. Importantly, this act 
classified cannabis as a narcotic.54 
Once the Uniform Act was published, Anslinger and the FBN 
vigorously lobbied State legislatures to adopt it.55 However, by March 1935, 
only ten States had done so.56 So, the FBN began a propaganda campaign 
against the “Marihuana Menace.” Anslinger marshalled the Hearst newspaper 
chain, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the World Narcotic Defense 
Association, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the Young Women’s 
Christian Association, the National Parent-Teacher Association, and the 
National Councils of Catholic Men and Women in this lobbying effort.57 
Collectively, these groups were known as Anslinger’s Army. The infamous 1936 
film Reefer Madness (also known as Tell Your Children and Doped Youth 
depending on where and when the film was shown) was part of Anslinger’s 
propaganda effort. Within one year of the start of Anslinger’s crusade, twenty-
eight States had adopted the Uniform Act.58 Notably, during this time, the 
American pharmaceutical industry resisted cannabis prohibition on the grounds 
 
50 See id. at 65-66. 
51 See id. at 66. 
52 See id. at 117. 
53 See id. at 69-75, 83. 
54 See id. at 90. 
55 See id. at 94-95. 
56 See id. at 95. 
57 See id. at 95-111. 
58 See id. at 115. 
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that cannabis had legitimate, medicinal benefits.59 
It has been suggested that Anslinger’s antipathy to cannabis was due to 
his family’s financial interests. Mellon appointed Anslinger to be the first 
commissioner of the FBN. Anslinger was married to Mellon’s niece. Mellon 
had a financial interest in a whiskey distillery. Therefore, the theory goes, 
Anslinger attacked cannabis in order to help Mellon’s whiskey business. This 
theory enjoys some popularity among Anslinger’s critics. However, there is 
little direct historical evidence to support it. 
 
B. Sonzinsky and the Marihuana Tax Act 
 
As described above, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act (1914) was upheld as 
a revenue raising law pursuant to Congress’s tax power. By the late-1930s, 
however, the law operated more as a drug prohibition statute and less as a 
revenue raising law.60This presented a potential problem for narcotics 
prohibitionists: May a de jure tax operate as a de facto prohibition? This issue 
was resolved in Sonzinsky v. United States.61 
In response to the gun violence associated with alcohol prohibition, 
Congress passed the National Firearms Act in 1934. This law required gun 
sellers to pay a $200 tax for every gun that they sold. Sonzinsky was convicted 
of violating this act and he appealed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the 
United States upheld the law as a “prohibitive tax.” That is, a tax primarily 
designed to prohibit conduct and not to raise revenue. 
Now that Sonzinsky had endorsed the legality of prohibitive taxes, 
Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 which placed a tax on the sale 
of cannabis.62 Anslinger aggressively lobbied Congress in favor of the 
Marihuana Tax Act.63 Just as the pharmaceutical industry opposed the Uniform 
State Narcotic Drug Act, the American Medical Association objected to the 
Marihuana Tax Act on the grounds that it would stop research on medical 
cannabis.64 Ultimately, the New Deal Congress was predisposed to robust 
federal action to prohibitively tax cannabis. As a result of the Marihuana Tax 
Act, research on medicinal cannabis became virtually nonexistent, possession 
and transfer of cannabis was a federal crime, and most cannabis in the United 
States grew wildly.65 The Marihuana Tax Act remained in effect until 1969 
when it was declared unconstitutional on Fifth Amendment grounds (self-
 
59 See id. at 118. 
60 See id. at 124-26. 
61 300 U.S. 506 (1937). 
62 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 126. 
63 See id. at 154. 
64 See id. at 164-65. 
65 See generally id. at 175-86. 
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incrimination) in Leary v. United States.66 
 
C. LaGuardia Report 
 
An important dissent to Anslinger’s public policy efforts was The 
Marihuana Problem in the City of New York (1944) (i.e., the LaGuardia 
Report).67 Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia commissioned this report and the New 
York Academy of Medicine prepared it.68The LaGuardia Report was a 
comprehensive study of the cannabis phenomenon. The report contained a 
sociological study, an examination of the mental attitudes of cannabis users 
toward society, a report on cannabis use among school children, a clinical 
study, a study of the “Marihuana Cigarette,” discussions of psychotic episodes, 
organic and systemic functions, psychophysical functions, and intellectual 
functioning, and a comparison between users and non-users regarding mental 
and physical deterioration.69 The LaGuardia Report contained several 
conclusions. Among these conclusions are: 
 
7. The practice of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction        
in the medical sense of the word. . . . 
 
9. The use of marihuana does not lead to morphine or heroin or 
cocaine addiction and no effort is made to create a market for 
these narcotics by stimulating the practice of marihuana 
smoking. 
 
10. Marihuana is not the determining factor in the commission of major 
crimes. . . . 
 
12. Juvenile delinquency is not associated with the practice of smoking 
marihuana. 
13. The publicity concerning the catastrophic effects of 
marihuana smoking in New York City is unfounded.70 
 
Thus, the LaGuardia Report rejected the Criminality Theory; the 
underlying theory of cannabis prohibition during the 1930s and 1940s. 
Moreover, the report presciently rejected the Gateway Drug Theory of cannabis 
prohibition. 
 
 
66 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
67 LaGuardia Report at 1, http://rodneybarnett.net/PDF/Laguardia%20Report%201944.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2020). 
68 See id. at 1-4. 
69 See generally id. 
70 Id. at 22. 
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VI. 1950S: THE GATEWAY DRUG THEORY AND THE BOGGS ACT 
 
In the post-World War II period, cannabis’s alleged link to addiction, 
insanity, and crime (the Criminality Theory) had fallen out of favor. The 
Criminality Theory had been the traditional rationale for cannabis prohibition.71 
In its place, cannabis prohibitionists began to rely upon (and continue to rely 
upon) the Gateway Drug Theory. That is, cannabis is allegedly a gateway to 
other drugs like cocaine, heroin, and morphine.72 
Based upon the Gateway Drug Theory, Congress passed the Boggs Act in 
1951.73 This law was named for Representative Thomas Hale Boggs, Sr. (D-
LA), who sponsored the legislation. The Boggs Act provided uniform penalties 
for violations of the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act and the Marihuana 
Tax Act. These penalties were draconian. For example, a first offense was 
punishable by two to five years in prison. A second offense was punishable by 
five to ten years imprisonment and a $2,000 fine. A third offense would result 
in ten to twenty years in prison and a $2,000 fine. Moreover, for second and 
subsequent offenses, there was no parole, probation, or suspended sentences.74 
As with the campaign in support of the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act 
of the 1930s, Anslinger and his allies (Anslinger’s Army) enthusiastically 
supported the Boggs Act.75 Many of the same groups from before joined this 
lobbying effort, including the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the 
General Federation of Women’s Clubs, and the National Congress of Parents 
and Teachers.76 The Boggs Act and its legislative history (including floor 
statements and committee testimony and exhibits) enshrined the Gateway Drug 
Theory of cannabis into public policy.77 By the 1950s, the societal consensus 
was that cannabis was a gateway drug. Therefore, the reasoning went, harsh 
criminal penalties were seen as the answer to end cannabis use and 
trafficking.78 
From 1951 to 1955, the federal Boggs Act inspired “Little Boggs Acts” 
among thirty-four States.79 The Ohio statute (1955) was particularly harsh, 
 
71 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 204. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 204. 
74 See id. at 210. 
75 See id. at 209. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 214-15. 
78 See id. at 206-08. 
79 See id. at 215, fn. 46. These States are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. at 218. 
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imposing a twenty to forty-year sentence for selling narcotics.80 Under the 
Louisiana statute (1956), prison sentences ranged from five to ninety-nine 
years.81 
As an aside, 1950s America was marked by widespread fear of 
Communism and the Cold War. Some associated drug trafficking with 
Communism. For example, in 1951 the Chief of the Los Angeles Police 
Department claimed that Communists agents were importing cannabis and 
other drugs in an attempt to corrupt American youth.82 
 
VII. 1960S TO EARLY-1970S 
 
By the end of the 1950s, American mainstream society reached a 
consensus regarding cannabis: (i) cannabis was a “narcotic,” and (ii) cannabis use 
was restricted to people in the lowest socio-economic levels.83 This consensus 
began to unravel in the 1960s. In 1963, psychologist Timothy Leary began 
experimenting with LSD at Harvard.  At the same time, the Psychedelic 
Movement began in San Francisco.84 These events influenced people throughout 
the country, particularly young adults. The great social movements of the 1960s 
created “[a] general loosening of restraints imposed by the legal system on 
behavior with ‘moral’ overtones.”85 These movements included the Civil Rights 
Movement, Free Speech Movement, Anti-Vietnam War Movement, and 
Environmentalism.86 Cannabis became a symbol of this counterculture.87 
By the late-1960s, cannabis use became associated with college students. 
These college students came from the middle and upper classes and had access 
to politicians and public opinion-makers.88 During this time, cannabis use 
became more widespread beyond the counterculture. Some American 
universities reported that up to seventy percent of their students used cannabis. 
Moreover, cannabis use became increasingly common among young 
professionals, blue-collar workers, and Vietnam War veterans. One watershed 
event in this changing perception of cannabis users was the 1970 arrest of 
Robert F. Kennedy Jr., and his cousin Sargent Shriver, III, for marijuana 
possession.89 Kennedy is, of course, the son of Senator Robert F. Kennedy 
and the nephew of both President John F. Kennedy and Senator Edward 
 
80 See id. at 215. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. at 209. 
83 See id. at 222. 
84 See id. at 224. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. at 227. 
88 See id. at 223. 
89 See id. at 238. 
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Kennedy. Shriver is a member of the Kennedy family and the son of the 
then-U.S. Ambassador to France. Once children of privilege began publicly 
using cannabis, the old stereotypes of the typical cannabis user were no longer 
valid. Consequently, cannabis use became less identified with any particular 
race, class, or age. And, cannabis was no longer associated entirely with radical 
politics and the hippie lifestyle.90 
 By the early 1970s, the draconian criminal penalties of the federal Boggs 
Act and the Little Boggs Acts became viewed as unjustly harsh. Police officers 
began to ignore minor violations, such as possession of small quantities of 
cannabis and personal use. Judges handed down less severe sentences for 
marijuana crimes. Courts began diversion programs for first time drug 
offenders.91 In 1970, thirty-two States reduced their criminal penalties for 
cannabis possession.92 
 
VIII. REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
BUREAUCRACY 
 
As described above, federal bureaucratic regulation of cannabis began 
with the Federal Narcotics Control Board (FNCB) in 1922. The FNCB was 
within the Treasury Department. 
In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) replaced the FNCB. 
The FBN was also a part of the Treasury Department. 
The Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) existed from 1966 to 1968 
within the Food and Drug Administration. 
In 1968, the FBN and BDAC were combined to form the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) within the Justice Department.93 The 
BNDD’s enforcement policy focused on major drug trafficking and not on 
possession.94 
In 1973, the BNDD was combined with other federal offices to form the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). These other federal offices included 
the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and Special Agents from the 
Bureau of Customs. Consequently, the DEA had a more pronounced law 
enforcement character than its predecessors. The DEA remained under the 
Justice Department.95 
The salient point here is that federal drug enforcement bureaucracy 
began in the Treasury Department, briefly included the Food and Drug 
Administration, and ended up in the Justice Department. This law enforcement 
orientation toward cannabis policy has been a feature of American public policy 
 
90 See id. at 237-38. 
91 See id. at 239-40. 
92 See id. at 279. 
93 See id. at 242. 
94 See id. 
95 See www.dea.gov (last visited Sept. 25, 2020). 
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since the DEA was established. 
 
IX. HOW MARIJUANA BECAME A SCHEDULE I DRUG 
 
For much of the Twentieth Century, American drug policy relied 
significantly on the Marihuana Tax Act. The Supreme Court of the United 
States ruled the Marihuana Tax Act unconstitutional in Leary v. United States.96 
In 1970, Congress sought to (i) replace the Marihuana Tax Act, and (ii) 
modernize American drug policy. Congress accomplished this in 1970 when it 
passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act and the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).97 
The CSA created the five-tiered Schedule system. Schedule I 
substances are defined as follows: 
 
The findings required for each of the schedules are as follows: 
 
(1) Schedule I.— 
 
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse. 
 
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States. [and] 
 
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other 
substance under medical supervision.”98 
 
There was controversy over whether cannabis belonged in Schedule I 
with conflicting testimony and evidence on both sides. The version of the CSA 
that ultimately became law empowered the Attorney General to decide whether 
to schedule new drugs and whether to re- schedule existing drugs, but with 
binding input from the Secretary of the Health, Education, & Welfare 
Department.99 Congress and the U.S. Attorney General provisionally 
categorized cannabis as a Schedule I drug, but promised to revisit the issue 
once the science was settled.100 In order to reach such a scientific consensus, the 
 
96 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
97 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 244 (The Controlled Substances Act is codified 
at 21 U.S.C. §801 et seq.). 
98 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C). 
99 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 246. See also 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1)-(2). 
Currently, Congress may reclassify cannabis out of Schedule I via legislation. Congress may also 
legislatively remove cannabis from the CSA schedule system entirely (i.e., deschedule). The U.S. 
Attorney General may also reclassify cannabis within the CSA schedule system and also 
deschedule cannabis. See id. 
100 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 246-47. 
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CSA established a Presidential Commission on Marihuana and Drug 
Abuse.101The Committee Report on the House Bill noted: “The Commission will 
be of aid in determining the appropriate disposition of the [marihuana 
scheduling] question in the future.”102 
In 1970, then, Congress created the National Commission on Marihuana 
and Drug Abuse. The Commission became popularly known as the “Shafer 
Commission” because the chairman was then-Pennsylvania governor Raymond 
Shafer. The Shafer Commission had thirteen members. The President appointed 
nine members. Congress appointed the other four.103 Richard Nixon was the 
president at this time. In that same year, President Nixon stated: “I am against 
legalizing marihuana. Even if the Commission does recommend that it be 
legalized, I will not follow that recommendation.”104 Because of President 
Nixon’s public and well documented opposition to cannabis legalization, critics 
expected the Shafer Commission to recommend against scheduling cannabis 
out of Schedule I because the president appointed a supermajority of the 
commission members. 
On May 26, 1971, as the Shafer Commission was preparing its report, 
President Nixon had a conversation in the Oval Office with White House Chief 
of Staff H.R. “Bob” Haldeman. The president stated: 
 
I want a Goddamn strong statement on marijuana. Can I get that 
out of this sonofabitching . . . Domestic Council[sic]? . . . I mean 
one on marijuana that just tears the ass out of them. . . . 
 
You know it’s a funny thing, every one of the bastards that are 
out for legalizing marijuana is Jewish. What the Christ is the 
matter with the Jews, Bob, what is the matter with them? . . . 
By God we are going to hit the marijuana thing, and I want to hit 
it right square in the puss 105 
In approximately the same time period, Haldeman wrote in his 
diary: “[Nixon] emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole 
[drug] problem is really the blacks. The key is to devise a system that 
recognizes this while not appearing to.”106 
 
101 See id. at 247. 
102 Id. (quoting U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st 
Cong., 2d sess. H. Rept. 91-1444, p. 13). 
103 See id. at 255. 
104 Id. at 256. 
105May 13, 1971 Oval Office Conversation – meeting with Nixon, Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman, http://www.csdp.org/research/nixonpot.txt (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2020). 
106 Haldeman Diary Says Nixon Railed Against Blacks, Jews in Media : Presidency: Book by late 
chief of staff is previewed on ‘Nightline.’ Another ex-aide says remarks show frustration, (May 
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Reflecting years later on the Nixon Administration’s cannabis policy, 
Nixon White House Domestic Affairs Advisor John D. Ehrlichman said: 
 
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after 
that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people We 
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or 
black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with 
marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both 
heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest 
their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and 
vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know 
we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.107 
 
On March 22, 1972, the Shafer Commission issued its report. Among the 
report’s findings and conclusions, the Shafer Commission rejected both the 
Criminality Theory and the Gateway Drug Theory and recommended 
decriminalizing marijuana. A month earlier, the National Institute of Mental 
Health issued a report that reached the same conclusions.108 
Two days after the Shafer Commission report was issued, President 
Nixon said: “I oppose the legalization of marihuana and that includes sale, 
possession[,] and use. I do not believe you can have effective criminal justice 
based on a philosophy that something is half-legal and half- illegal.”109 Law 
enforcement officials also condemned the Shafer Commission’s report.110 In 
October 1972, President Nixon declared “drug abuse” to be “America’s public 
enemy number one.”111 Finally, on March 10, 1973, President Nixon stated: 
In recent days, there have been proposals to legalize the possession 
and use of marihuana. I oppose the legalization of the sale, 
possession[,] or use of marihuana. The line against the use of 
dangerous drugs is now drawn on this side of marihuana. If we move 
the line to the other side and accept the use of this drug, how can 
we draw the line against other illegal drugs? . . . There must 
continue to be criminal sanctions against the possession, sale[,] or 
use of marihuana.112 
 
1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-05-17/news/mn-58835_1_haldeman-diary (last visited Oct. 
6, 2020). 
107 Press Release, We Are the Drug Policy Alliance, Top Adviser to Richard Nixon Admitted 
that ‘War on Drugs’ was Policy Tool to Go After Anti-War Protestors and ‘Black People’ 
(Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.drugpolicy.org/press-release/2016/03/top-adviser-richard-nixon-
admitted-war-drugs-was-policy-tool- go-after-anti. 
108 See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 262-70. 
109 Id. at 273. 
110 See id. at 274-75. 
111 Id. at 291. 
112 Id. 
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Thus, the Nixon Administration rejected the Shafer Commission report and 
caused cannabis to remain a Schedule I drug under the CSA. Cannabis has 
remained a Schedule I drug ever since. 
 
X. CHANGING SOCIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS MARIJUANA 
 
A. Presidential Politics 
 
President Nixon resigned from office following the Watergate Scandal in 
1974. From 1974 to present, subsequent presidential administrations have 
continued the Nixon Administration’s cannabis policies. These administrations 
are Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump; Five 
Republicans and three Democrats. Notable during this period was First Lady 
Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” anti-drug campaign which included, of course, 
cannabis. 
Nevertheless, social attitudes have significantly changed over the last 
five decades. In March 1992, while campaigning for president, Bill Clinton 
said: “When I was in England, I experimented with marijuana a time or two, 
and didn’t like it. I didn’t inhale and I didn’t try it again.”113 Three years later, 
Barack Obama wrote Dreams From My Father in advance of his campaign for 
the Illinois Senate. He republished the book in 2004 after he became a national, 
public figure. In this memoir, Obama admitted to cannabis and cocaine use.114 
When he ran for president in 2007, the public was largely unconcerned with his 
drug use history. So, in the span of twelve years, American society went from a 
presidential candidate who dubiously denied cannabis use to a candidate who 
openly admitted to it without any negative political consequences. 
 
B. Popular Culture 
 
Evolving social attitudes toward cannabis use are also reflected in popular 
culture. In 1976, Jamaican Reggae musician Peter Tosh released an album 
called “Legalize It.” Although this song was initially banned in Jamaica, it has 
become a popular decriminalization anthem. From the mid- 1960s until the 
1990s, the band Grateful Dead was strongly associated with marijuana. Their 
concerts were de facto marijuana conventions.115 In the 1980s and 1990s, a 
similar phenomenon occurred with the band Phish. Since the 1990s, hip hop 
artist Snoop Dogg has openly used and advocated in support of cannabis. 
 
113 Olivia B. Waxman, Bill Clinton Said He ‘Didn’t Inhale’ 25 Years Ago—But the History of U.S. 
Presidents and Drugs Is Much Older (Mar. 29, 2017), https://time.com/4711887/bill-clinton-
didn’t-inhale-marijuana-anniversary/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). 
114 See BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE 93-94 
(1995, 2004). 
115 See Danny Danko, 25 years of Chem Dog, (Sept. 7, 2016), http://hightimes.com/grow/25-years-
of-chem-dog/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2020). 
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During the 1970s and 1980s, comedy duo Cheech and Chong had an act 
which largely involved cannabis-based humor. Tommy Chong remains a 
prominent cannabis reform advocate. The 1998 cult film The Big Lebowski 
featured a protagonist who frequently smoked cannabis. The television series 
That ‘70s Show ran from 1998 to 2006 on the Fox Broadcasting Network. This 
show regularly featured cannabis themed jokes. The popular 2004 film Harold 
& Kumar Go To White Castle is a comedy that tells the story of two young men 
who smoke cannabis, become hungry, and embark on an odyssey to get fast 
food. Finally, in 2005, the film Reefer Madness was remade as a musical 
comedy. 
These popular culture elements portrayed cannabis use in a positive, 
often comical, light that reflected a broad social acceptance of cannabis use, 
and the rejection of the traditional arguments against cannabis use, such as the 
Criminality and Gateway Drug Theories. 
 
XI. STATE AND FEDERAL MARIJUANA LAWS FROM THE 1990S TO 2010S 
 
A. State Legalization of Medical and Recreational Cannabis 
 
Despite changing social attitudes in favor of cannabis decriminalization, 
cannabis cultivation, manufacturing, possession, importation, exportation, 
trafficking, and use remain criminal offenses. The federal statutes are codified 
at 21 U.S.C. §§841-865 (Part D—Offenses and Penalties). These statutes are 
the criminal enforcement portion of the Controlled Substances Act. Every State 
has similar statutes criminalizing cannabis.116 Nevertheless, States began 
legalizing cannabis for medicinal use beginning in 1996. Currently, thirty-six 
jurisdictions have legalized medical cannabis: 
 
1996 California 
1998 Alaska, Oregon, Washington 
1999 Maine 
2000 Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada 
2004 Montana, Vermont 
2006 Rhode Island 
2007 New Mexico 
2008 Michigan 
2010 Arizona, District of Columbia, New Jersey 
2011 Delaware 
2012 Connecticut, Massachusetts 
2013 Illinois, New Hampshire 
2014 Maryland, Minnesota, New York 
2016 Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania 
2017 West Virginia 
2018 Missouri, Oklahoma, Utah 
 
116 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925 (West 2020). 
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   2020  Mississippi, South Dakota117 
 
If one includes cannabidiol118 types of medical cannabis119, then the 
following seventeen States may be added to the above list: 
 
2014  Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin  
2015  Georgia, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming 
2017  Indiana, South Dakota 
2018  Kansas120 
 
Going further, sixteen jurisdictions have currently legalized non-
medical, adult use, recreational cannabis: 
 
2012 Colorado, Washington 
2014 Alaska, District of Columbia, Oregon 
2016 California, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada 
2018 Michigan, Vermont 
2019 Illinois 
   2020   Arizona, Montana, New Jersey, South Dakota121 
 
B. Conant v. Walters 
 
As noted above, California legalized medicinal cannabis in 1996. That 
same year, the Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control 
 
117 See Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG 
https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/legal-medical-marijuana-states-and-dc/ (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2020). 
118 Cannabidiol (“CBD”) is a type of cannabinoid in the cannabis plant that has shown promise in 
treating several conditions, particularly epilepsy. It lacks the psychoactive effects of 
Tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”). It is also known as “Charlotte’s Web Oil” or “CBD oil.” 
119 Prior to 2014, the DEA deemed all CBD to be marijuana-derived, and therefore, illegal. See 
DEA Statement on CBD, Hemp and “Farm Bill” (August 2015), 
https://fedupwithfatigue.com/dea-cbd-statement.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2020). In 2014, 
Congress passed a Farm Bill which created a hemp production pilot program. See 7 U.S.C. § 5940. 
In 2018, Congress passed another Farm Bill which expanded the pilot program and legalized hemp 
cultivation, processing, and the sale of hemp products, including hemp-derived CBD products. See 
84 Fed. Reg. 58,522-64; Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Public Law 115-334 (115th 
Cong.) (Dec. 20, 2018). After 2018, then, a legal distinction exists between marijuana-derived 
CBD (illegal) and hemp-derived CBD (legal). Because of this legal distinction and the 
proliferation of lawful, hemp-derived CBD, the importance of CBD in medical cannabis policy is 
greatly diminished. 
120 See States with Legal Cannabidiol (CBD), PROCON.ORG (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=006473 (last visited Sept. 25, 
2020). 
121 See Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 117.  
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Policy (i.e., Drug Czar), the DEA, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)122 promulgated a 
policy in response to California’s medical cannabis legalization: 
The federal policy declared that a doctor’s “action of 
recommending or prescribing Schedule I controlled substances is 
not consistent with the ‘public interest’ (as that phrase is used in 
the federal Controlled Substances Act)” and that such action 
would lead to revocation of the physician’s registration to 
prescribe controlled substances.123 
 
Also pursuant to the policy, the DOJ and HHS sent letters “to practitioner 
associations and [State medical] licensing boards informing those groups of the 
policy.”124 This letter “cautioned physicians who ‘intentionally provide their 
patients with oral or written statements in order to enable them to obtain 
controlled substances in violation of federal law . . . risk revocation of their 
DEA prescription authority.’”125 
In order to lawfully prescribe medications, a physician must (i) be 
licensed to practice medicine by the relevant State regulatory authority (i.e., 
State medical board), and (ii) have a Controlled Substance Registration 
Certificate from the DEA.126 Without these two credentials, a physician may 
not lawfully prescribe medications. It is virtually impossible to practice 
medicine without the ability to prescribe. Thus, the federal policy threatened to 
effectively prevent physicians who recommended medical cannabis from 
practicing medicine. “By speaking candidly to their patients about the potential 
benefits of medical marijuana, [physicians] risk losing their license to write 
prescriptions, which would prevent them from functioning as doctors. In other 
words, they may destroy their careers and lose their livelihoods.”127 
In response, four patient and physician groups sued the Drug Czar, 
DEA, DOJ, and HHS for injunctive relief in the U.S. District for the Northern 
District of California. Specifically, and based upon the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment, the plaintiffs sought to permanently “enjoin enforcement 
of the government policy insofar as it threatened to punish physicians for 
communicating with their patients about the medical use of marijuana.”128 The 
trial court certified a plaintiff class, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and 
permanently enjoined the defendants from: 
 
 
122 See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 946 (2003). 
123 Id. at 632. 
124 Id. at 633. 
125 Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Medical Leader Letter). 
126 See Form DEA-223. 
127 Conant, supra, at 639-40 (Kozinski, J.) (concurring). 
128 Id. at 633. 
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(i) revoking any physician class member’s DEA registration 
merely because the doctor makes a recommendation for the use of 
medical marijuana based on a sincere medical judgment and (ii) 
from initiating any investigation solely on that ground. The 
injunction should apply whether or not the doctor anticipates that 
the patient will, in turn, use his or her recommendation to obtain 
marijuana in violation of federal law.129 
The federal government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed largely on free speech and federalism 
grounds.130 The federal government unsuccessfully sought U.S. Supreme Court 
review.131 When a federal circuit court decides an issue of first impression, other 
circuit courts tend to eventually decide the same issue. Often a circuit split 
emerges. That is, one group of circuits decides the issue one way and another 
group decides the issue another way. Once a circuit split matures, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will often agree to review a suitable case to resolve the circuit 
split. This did not happen with Conant. By denying certiorari review, the U.S. 
Supreme Court let Conant stand, perhaps with the idea that the circuit courts 
would address the issue and either form a consensus or create a circuit split. 
However, no other federal intermediate appellate court has squarely addressed 
the medical- cannabis-recommendation-as-free speech issue.132 
 
 
129 Id. at 634. 
130 See id. at 634-39. 
131 See Conant v. Walters, 540 U.S. 946 (2003). 
132 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (citing Conant regarding scientific studies on the 
potential therapeutic and medicinal benefits of cannabis); NIFLA v. Harris, 2016 WL 5956734 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (declining to extend Conant to a free speech and free exercise challenge to a state 
contraception notice statute because the challenged statute, unlike Conant, did not discriminate 
based on viewpoint); NCAA v. Christie, 2016 WL 4191891 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Conant regarding 
commandeering); Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2014), 775 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 
2014) (citing Conant regarding commandeering); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), 
728 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Conant regarding the distinction between conduct 
and speech); NCAA v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Conant regarding 
commandeering); James v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 2012), 684 F.3d 825 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (amended and superseded on denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Conant in unsuccessful 
Americans with Disabilities Act challenge to city ordinances banning medical marijuana 
dispensaries); United States v. Osburn, 175 Fed. Appx. 789 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Conant 
regarding public notice that cannabis is illegal under federal law); Willis v. Town of Marshall, NC, 
426 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Conant regarding the “right to hear”); King v. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Conant regarding freedom to speak and 
the freedom to read); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Disability Services of the Southwest, Inc., 400 F.3d 260 
(5th Cir. 2005) (citing Conant regarding the importance of physician-patient communication); 
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Conant regarding state police power to 
regulate the medical profession); and Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Conant in discussion of “attenuation” between (i) medical marijuana activities that are legal under 
state law and (ii) interstate commerce). See also Nevada Attorney General Opinion No. 2015-03 
(June 18, 2015); and Iowa Attorney General Opinion No. 02-12-1 (Dec. 10, 2002). 
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The Conant case is important to current cannabis policy for three reasons. 
First, Conant addresses the distinction between “prescriptions” and 
“recommendations.”133 A “prescription” is an order from a physician to a 
pharmacist directing the pharmacist to dispense a controlled substance to a 
patient. Without such a prescription, it is illegal for the pharmacist to dispense the 
medication, and it is also illegal for the patient to possess the medication. As such, 
a “prescription” is not a free speech activity. Rather, it is a proper subject of State 
and federal regulation. Second, Conant stands for the proposition that a 
physician’s medical cannabis recommendation to a patient is protected free speech 
under the First Amendment. Although this concept has not been adopted by 
subsequent caselaw, it appears to be the de facto rule regarding physicians who 
endorse medical cannabis. Finally, because of Conant, States that have legalized 
medicinal cannabis use the term “recommend” instead of “prescribe.”134 
 
C. Federal Cannabis Criminal Enforcement Policy 
 
i. Ogden Memorandum 
 
In March 2009, as part of the Obama Administration, Eric Holder was 
installed as U.S. Attorney General. At this time, thirteen states had legalized 
medical cannabis. On October 19, 2009, Deputy Attorney General David W. 
Ogden issued the “Ogden Memo” to “provide[ ] clarification and guidance to 
federal prosecutors in States that have enacted laws authorizing the medical use of 
marijuana.”135 The Ogden Memo advised that it would be an inefficient use of 
federal law enforcement resources to prosecute patients and caregivers lawfully 
involved in State- sanctioned medical marijuana activities.136 However, the Ogden 
Memo also stated that it would be an efficient use of federal law enforcement 
resources where marijuana activities—medical or otherwise—implicated the 
following areas: 
 
[i] unlawful possession or unlawful use of firearms; 
 
[ii] violence; 
 
[iii] sales to minors; 
 
[iv] financial and marketing activities inconsistent with the 
terms, conditions, or purposes of state law, including 
evidence of money laundering activity and/or financial 
gains or excessive amounts of cash inconsistent with 
 
133 See Conant, supra, at 635. 
134 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4731.30 (West 2020) (“Certificate to recommend medical use 
of marijuana”). 
135 Odgen Memo at 1. 
136 See id. at 1-2. 
 24 
purported compliance with state or local law; 
 
[v] amounts of marijuana inconsistent with purported 
compliance with state or local law; 
 
[vi] illegal possession or sale of other controlled substances; or 
 
[vii] ties to other criminal enterprises.137 
 
ii. First Cole Memorandum 
 
On June 29, 2011, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued the 
First Cole Memo which reaffirmed the guidance contained in the Ogden Memo 
and advised that large-scale cannabis growers would remain a federal law 
enforcement priority even if such growers claimed to be cultivating medical 
marijuana.138 At this time, seventeen jurisdictions had legalized medical 
cannabis. 
iii. Second Cole Memorandum 
 
On August 29, 2013, Cole issued the Second Cole Memo.139 At this 
time, twenty-one jurisdictions had legalized medical cannabis. Moreover, 
Colorado and Washington had legalized adult use cannabis while Alaska, 
Oregon, and the District of Columbia were preparing to do likewise. The 
Second Cole Memo updated the guidance of the first two memoranda “in light 
of state ballot initiatives that legalize under state law the possession of small 
amounts of marijuana and provide for the regulation of marijuana production, 
processing, and sale.”140 
The Second Cole Memo also updated the federal enforcement priorities 
outlined in the Ogden Memo as follows: 
 
[i] Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; 
 
[ii]  Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana 
from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and 
cartels; 
 
[ii] Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states 
where it is legal under state law in some form to 
other states; 
 
 
137 Id. at 2. 
138 See First Cole Memo at 1-2. 
139 See Second Cole Memo at 1. 
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[iii] Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity 
from being used as a cover or pretext for the 
trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal 
activity; 
 
[iv] Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the 
cultivation and distribution of marijuana; 
 
[v] Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation 
of other adverse public health consequences 
associated with marijuana use; 
 
[vi] Preventing growing marijuana on public lands 
and the attendant public safety and environmental 
dangers posed by marijuana production on public 
lands; and 
 
[vii] Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal 
property.141 
 
The Second Cole Memo went on to advise that, so long as (i) the 
cannabis-legalizing States maintained “strong and effective regulatory and 
enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession 
of marijuana,”142 and (ii) the cannabis activity did not touch upon any of the 
eight enforcement priorities, federal law enforcement officials would deem 
cannabis enforcement an inefficient use of its resources and leave regulation 
and criminal enforcement to State and local authorities.143 Holder served as 
U.S. Attorney General until April 2015. Loretta Lynch succeeded Holder as 
U.S. Attorney General for the remainder of the Obama Administration. Lynch’s 
administration maintained the guidance outlined in the Ogden and Cole Memos. 
In fact, Lynch was copied on the Second Cole Memo as the then-U.S. Attorney 
for the Eastern District of New York and Chair of the Attorney General’s 
Advisory Committee.144 This suggests that Lynch concurred with the Second 
Cole Memo. 
* * * 
 
Collectively, these three memoranda set-forth a policy that, so long as 
State medicinal cannabis activities did not involve any of the eight enforcement 
priorities, federal prosecutors would not bring criminal charges against medical 
cannabis participants. This amounted to passive permission for people to engage 
 
141 Id. at 2-3. 
142 Id. at 2. 
143 See id. at 2-3. 
144 See id. at 3. 
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in medical cannabis activities with greatly reduced fear of federal criminal 
liability. However, these memoranda merely indicated that the DOJ had chosen 
not to prosecute certain medical cannabis activities, but it reserved the right to 
do so. Moreover, these memoranda did not provide a legal defense. If a federal 
prosecutor decided to charge someone with a marijuana crime, these 
memoranda provided no legal cover. Finally, these memoranda were always 
subject to modification or rescission by subsequent Attorneys General. So, the 
memoranda’s policies and guidance lacked the permanence, stability, and 
predictability of a statute. Nevertheless, the Ogden Memo, First Cole Memo, 
and Second Cole Memo created a legal environment which allowed the 
fledgling cannabis industry to grow into a multi-billion-dollar sector. 
 
iv. Sessions Memorandum 
 
In February 2017, Jeff Sessions became U.S. Attorney General. 
Sessions is a staunch opponent of cannabis use. Thus, pro-cannabis reform 
advocates and the cannabis industry were quite concerned about what cannabis 
law enforcement policies Sessions would implement. For example, the 
governors of Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington co-authored a letter to 
Sessions urging him to continue the policy guidance outlined in the Second 
Cole Memo.145 Sessions rebuffed the governors’ concerns.146 
 
On January 4, 2018, Sessions formally rescinded the Ogden, First Cole, 
and Second Cole Memos: 
 
In the Controlled Substances Act, Congress has generally 
prohibited the cultivation, distribution, and possession of 
marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. It has established significant 
penalties for these crimes. 21 U.S.C. § 841 et seq. These 
activities also may serve as the basis for the prosecution of other 
crimes, such as those prohibited by the money laundering 
statutes, the unlicensed money transmitter statute, and the Bank 
Secrecy Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57, 1960; 31U.S.C. §5318. 
These statutes reflect Congress’s determination that marijuana is 
a dangerous drug and that marijuana activity is a serious crime. 
 
In deciding which marijuana activities to prosecute under these 
laws with the Department’s finite resources, prosecutors should 
follow the well-established principles that govern all federal 
prosecutions. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti originally set 
forth these principles in 1980, and they have been refined over 
 
145 See Apr. 3, 2017 Letter to Sessions. 
146 See July 24, 2017 Letter from Sessions. 
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time, as reflected in chapter 9-27.000 of the U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual. These principles require federal prosecutors deciding 
which cases to prosecute to weigh all relevant considerations, 
including federal law enforcement priorities set by the Attorney 
General, the seriousness of the crime, the deterrent effect of 
criminal prosecution, and the cumulative impact of particular 
crimes on the community. 
 
Given the Department’s well-established general principles, 
previous nationwide guidance specific to marijuana 
enforcement is unnecessary and is rescinded, effective 
immediately. This memorandum is intended solely as a guide to 
the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion in 
accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and 
appropriations. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be 
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.147 
 
v. Sessions Memorandum Aftermath 
 
Initially, the Sessions Memo caused a great deal of concern within the 
cannabis industry. Many feared a harsh, alcohol prohibition-style federal law 
enforcement crackdown against cannabis industry participants. These fears 
have not materialized for four primary reasons. 
 
First, the revocation of the Ogden and Cole Memos made the various 
U.S. Attorneys much more important to federal cannabis law enforcement 
policy. From the Ogden Memo to the Sessions Memo (2009-2018), the entire 
U.S. Department of Justice, which includes all of the U.S. Attorney Offices, was 
advised against prosecuting the cannabis industry so long as the cannabis 
activities did not implicate any of the enforcement priorities. The Sessions 
Memo abolished this guidance and instructed U.S. Attorneys to treat cannabis 
industry activities the same as any other potential criminal conduct. Thus, it 
was left to the individual U.S. Attorney Offices to decide whether or not to 
prosecute cannabis industry participants. 
 
Presently, virtually none of the U.S. Attorney Offices have used the 
broader, post-Sessions Memo latitude to vigorously prosecute the cannabis 
industry. For example, on the day the Sessions Memo was published, the U.S. 
Attorney for the District of Colorado issued a statement: 
 
Today the Attorney General rescinded the Cole Memo on 
marijuana prosecutions, and directed that federal marijuana 
prosecution decisions be governed by the same principles that 
 
147 Sessions Memo (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
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have long governed all of our prosecution decisions. The United 
States Attorney’s Office in Colorado has already been guided by 
these principles in marijuana prosecutions—focusing in 
particular on identifying and prosecuting those who create the 
greatest safety threats to our communities around the state. We 
will, consistent with the Attorney General’s latest guidance, 
continue to take this approach in all of our work with our law 
enforcement partners throughout Colorado.148 
 
The cannabis industry interpreted this statement to mean that, at least in the 
District of Colorado, the post-Sessions Memo environment would be little 
different than the Ogden and Cole Memo period. This statement was also 
important because Colorado has a relatively mature cannabis industry market 
and, therefore, serves as a leader and exemplar to the other U.S. cannabis 
industry markets. Moreover, since the Sessions Memo, it appears that the 
various U.S. Attorney Offices are continuing to follow the Ogden and Cole 
Memos. Although the Ogden and Cole Memos are no longer the federal 
cannabis enforcement policy de jure, they remain the de facto policy. Finally, 
U.S. Attorneys are, at least indirectly, subject to the political will of the citizens 
of their respective districts. If, for example, a U.S. Attorney vigorously 
prosecuted the cannabis industry in a State where cannabis is popular, there 
would likely be political repercussions. And, if such a U.S. Attorney were to 
later seek elective office, his history of unpopular cannabis prosecutions would 
likely be a significant political liability. In sum, the post-Sessions Memo DOJ 
has not significantly affected the cannabis industry. 
Second, Congress has withheld DOJ and FBI funding for investigations 
and prosecutions of the medical cannabis industry since 2014. This legislation 
is associated primarily with Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) who co-
sponsored defunding language in various appropriations bills since the early-
2000s. A recent reiteration of this defunding legislation was passed as part of 
the federal appropriations act for the 2019 fiscal year: 
 
None of the funds made available under this Act to the 
Department of Justice may be used, with respect to any of the 
States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
 
148 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office: District of Colorado, U.S. Attorney Bob Troyer Issues 
Statement Regarding Marijuana Prosecutions in Colorado (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-co/pr/us-attorney-bob-troyer-issues- statement-regarding-
marijuana-prosecutions-colorado.(last visited Nov. 11, 2020). 
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Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, or with respect to the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Guam, or Puerto Rico, to prevent any of them from 
implementing their own laws that authorize the use, distribution, 
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.149 
 
Thus, even if the DOJ wanted to vigorously investigate and prosecute medical 
cannabis operators, it lacks the funds to do so. 
Third, since the Sessions Memo, States have continued to establish and 
operate medical and recreational cannabis programs. Specifically, since 2018, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Utah have legalized medical cannabis, and Illinois, 
Michigan, and Vermont have legalized adult use cannabis. These States continue 
to permit cannabis industry activity within their borders without apparent 
concern for federal criminal law enforcement. 
Finally, over the last decade the cannabis industry has achieved inertia 
that defies criminal law enforcement resistance. The cannabis industry has 
ceased to be an outlaw community of low capital outsiders and has become a 
multi-billion dollar, mainstream enterprise. Politically powerful individuals and 
corporations are now involved in the cannabis industry. The cannabis industry 
directly and indirectly employs thousands of people. In the current 
environment, a large- scale law enforcement crackdown on the cannabis 
industry would be intolerably economically disruptive and impolitic. 
 
vi. Attorney General Barr 
 
With the resignation of Attorney General Sessions, President Trump 
nominated William Barr to be U.S. Attorney General in 2018.150 The following 
colloquy occurred during Barr’s Senate confirmation hearing: 
 
Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ):  “Do you believe it was the right decision to 
rescind [the Cole Memo]?” 
 
Mr. Barr: “My approach to this would be not 
to upset settled expectations and 
the reliance interest that have arisen 
as a result of the Cole Memoranda 
and investments that have been 
made . . . . However, I think the 
current situation is untenable          
I’m not going to 
go after companies that have relied 
 
149 H.R.J. Res. 31 Division C, Title V, § 531, 116th Cong. (2019). 
150 Barr was sworn in as U.S. Attorney General on Feb. 14, 2019. 
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on the Cole Memoranda. 
However, we either should have a 
federal law that prohibits 
marijuana everywhere, which I 
would support myself. Because I 
think it’s a mistake to back off on 
marijuana.  However, if 
we want states to have their own 
laws . . . let’s get there the right 
way.”151 
Here, Barr summarized the current federal legal dilemma concerning 
cannabis. First, by acknowledging the “settled expectations,” Barr recognizes 
the existence of a large and wealthy American cannabis industry that has 
emerged over the last decade. Second, Barr acknowledges the untenable 
situation of the current state of U.S. cannabis law: How can there be legal 
medical and recreational cannabis at the State level when cannabis is illegal 
federally? Third, Barr admits to his anti-cannabis personal policy preferences. 
Unlike individuals like Anslinger and Nixon, however, Barr seems unwilling to 
allow his personal views to drive his administration’s public policies. This is 
progress. Finally, Barr implicitly asks Congress to resolve the dilemma 
legislatively. In any event, Barr’s DOJ has so far maintained the status quo with 
respect to federal cannabis law enforcement. 
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
 
Were cannabis a newly discovered plant, it would be heralded as a 
miracle drug and the pharmaceutical industry would enthusiastically study it to 
unlock its therapeutic secrets. This is not the case. Cannabis has a long history. 
With respect to American public policy, the history of cannabis is shaped by 
racism, nativism, mendacity, unintended consequences, and a host of other 
imperfect human motives. Current federal cannabis policy is not a product of 
logic, reason, facts, evidence, or science. It is a product of history. History is 
not necessarily a linear march toward progress. Civilizations rise and fall. 
Enlightenment can give way to barbarism. Therefore, it is possible that 
American society could eventually return to cannabis prohibition. At present, 
this outcome seems highly unlikely. Instead, in late 2020, comprehensive 
federal reform of cannabis laws appears to be a matter of “when,” not “if.” It 
remains to be seen what form such federal reforms will take. 
 
 
 
151 Nomination of the Honorable William Pehlam Barr to be Attorney General of the U.S. Before 
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N.J. and William Barr, nominee). 
 
